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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Procedural History 
Monica Garner (Appellant) files for divorce against Chris Garner 
Stipulated Decree of Divorce enters 
Respondent files Motion to Modify Decree of Divorce 
Court dismisses Motion to Modify after trial based upon Respondent's 
failure to show a substantial and material change of circumstances 
November 7, 2012: Appellant files Motion to Modify Decree of Divorce (child support) 
November 13, 2012: Appellants files Motion for Attorney's Fees and supporting documentation 
November 20, 2012: Respondent files Motion to Dismiss Appellant's Motion to Modify 
November 27, 2012: Respondent files Objection to Appellant's Motion for Attorney's Fees 
February 19, 2013: Court Orders an award of attorney's fees to Appellant in a reduced amount 
February 26, 2013: After hearing, the Court dismisses the Appellant's Motion to Modify 
March 1, 2013: Respondent files Motion for Attorney's Fees and supporting 
documentation 
March 8, 2013: 
March 15, 2013: 
March 29, 2013: 
April 26, 2013: 
05/15/2013: 
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Court enters written Order to Dismiss Appellant's Motion to Modify 
Appellant files Objection to Attorney's Fees 
Appellant files District Court appeal 
Court awards Respondent's Attorney's Fees 
Order Granting Attorney's Fees for $1,012.50 
05/20/2013: 
02/24/2014: 
Notice of Appeal filed by Appellant regarding Attorney's Fees granted on 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
06/13/2014: Order Granting Attorney Fees (from District Court) 
06/17/2014: Amended Notice of Appeal (including Attorney's fees) 
Factual History 
This appeal arises out of a Motion to Dismiss a Motion to Modify, an award of a reduced 
amount of attorney's fees from a Motion to Modify, an award of attorney's fees on the Motion to 
Dismiss and an award of attorney's fees on appeal. 
In this case, the Appellant and Respondent obtained a divorce in 2010. Respondent, 
Christopher Garner, filed a prose Motion to Modify on March 16, 2012. After hearing, the trial 
court ruled that Respondent had failed to show a substantial and material change of 
circumstances and dismissed Respondent's petition. Appellant filed a request for attorney's fees 
in an amount in excess of $18,000. In the Appellant's Motion for Attorney's Fees, it is clear 
that counsel for the Appellant recognized this matter could be dismissed early on and even billed 
Appellant for preparation of a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of filing said Motion, 
Appellant chose to take the matter to trial and have it dismissed after the Respondent's case in 
chief was presented. In responding to Appellant's Motion for Attorney's Fees, the Respondent 
did not deny that an award of fees should enter, but objected to the amount of Appellant's 
attorney's fees. Each party submitted written argument and the trial court entered an award of 
attorney's fees in the amount of $2,500.00, noting that the case was not particularly complicated 
and could have been disposed of at a much earlier time. 
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Immediately after the court dismissed Respondent's Motion to Modify, Appellant filed a 
Motion to Modify Child Support. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appellant's new 
Motion. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court ruled that Appellant had failed to show 
a substantial and material change in circumstances and dismissed Appellant's Motion. Appellant 
appealed the magistrate's decision to the District Court, and the District Court ruled in favor of 
Respondent. Appellant now appeals to the Supreme Court. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court properly dismissed Appellant's Petition to Modify. 
2. Whether the District properly upheld the award of attorney's fees as set by the Magistrate, 
3. Whether Respondent is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Standard of Review for an Order to Modify a Child Support A ward at the Trial Level 
and Appellate level 
The decision of the trial court on a motion to modify child support is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion on appeal. The standard of review on an appeal from a child support award 
is whether the court abused its discretion. A support award will not be disturbed on appeal absent 
a manifest abuse of discretion. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 23, 25, 855 P.2d 484,486 
(Ct.App.1993). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate 
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries 
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). However, 
any interpretation of the I.C.S.G. is a question oflaw and will be reviewed freely. Robertson 
Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,101,952 P.2d 914,916 (Ct.App.1998). Where, as here, 
the trial court sat without a jury, an appellate court liberally construes the trial court's findings of 
fact in favor of the judgment entered. Wilson v. Wilson, 131 Idaho 533, 535, 960 P.2d 1262, 
1264 (1998). 
Where the district court has acted in an appellate capacity and a further appeal is taken, 
this Court independently reviews the complete record before the magistrate, but with due regard 
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to the district court's decision. Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 442,444, 958 P.2d 599, 601 
(Ct.App.1998). 
2. Standard of Review for Attorney's Fees. 
The decision to award attorney fees is discretionary with absent an abuse of the discretion, a 
trial court's grant or denial of attorney's fees will not be disturbed on appeal. Anti! v. Antil, 127 
Idaho, 954,958,908 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Ct.App. 1996). A district court may award attorney's fees 
. . 
on appeal under Idaho Code Section 12-121 only if the appeal was brought frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002). 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The Magistrate Correctly Dismissed the Appellant's Petition and the District Court Correctly 
Upheld the Magistrate's Decision. 
This issue is actually two separate issues: Whether this court should overturn the district 
court's ruling based upon public policy and, if not, whether the Appellant showed a substantial 
and material change of circumstances when bringing the petition. 
Before addressing the legal strengths of Respondent's case, it must be noted that 
Appellant attempted to supp01t her argument with supposition and made-up "facts." The 
Appellant opines about the motivation behind the Respondent's decision to request a dismissal. 
The argument set forth is neither factual nor based upon any legal justification. The opinions of 
Appellant that Respondent is a bad father and a terrible person are incorrect and inappropriate for 
a brief submitted to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Court should not consider the slanderous 
words and Respondent respectfully requests the rebuttal brief contain only arguments that have a 
factual basis in the record or are based upon solid legal arguments. 
a. The Argument was Not Properly Brought Before the Magistrate. 
Appellant failed to assert the public policy argument before the magistrate. As the 
district cowt stated, in addition to failing to bring this issue before the magistrate, there is no 
evidence in the record to support it. As a general matter, "[i]ssues not raised below and 
presented for the first time on appeal will not be considered for review." Izaguirre v. R&L 
Carriers Shared Services, LLC, 155 Idaho 229, 308 P.3d 929, 933 (2013). 
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b. The agreement does not violate public policy 
In Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 265 P.3d 502, 151 Idaho 889 (Idaho 
2011 ), the court found that the public policy of legislative enactments cannot be questioned by 
the courts and avoided simply because the courts might not agree with the public policy so 
announced. The Court stated that "indeed, the contention that we could revise an unambiguous 
statute because we believed it was absurd or would produce absurd results is itself illogical. 
In Ver ska, the court was considering an appeal from an order of the district court holding 
that the statute making peer review records privileged applies, by its terms, to a lawsuit brought 
against a hospital claiming that the hospital acted in bad faith in refusing to renew a physician's 
privileges. In that case, Plaintiff argued that the statement of purpose accompanying that 
legislation indicated that it was intended to apply only to medical malpractice actions. The 
statement of purpose was not enacted into law. The Court held that "there is no wording in 
section 39-1392b that limits its scope to peer review records sought in a medical malpractice 
action. In that respect, the legislation is unambiguous. The asserted purpose for enacting the 
legislation cannot modify its plain meaning ... If the statute as written is socially or otherwise 
unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." (Citations Omitted). The 
interpretation of a statute "must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be 
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Idaho Code Section § 32-709 states as follows: 
"The provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to 
installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification and only upon a showing of a 
substantial and material change of circumstances." 
The statute is not ambiguous. Even if this court believes the stipulation is wrong and was 
done in contravention to public policy, it is still bound to follow the law. It is not like the 
Appellant did not have protections. However, as discussed more fully below, she did not avail 
herself to those safeguards. 
Another factor to consider is the terms of the stipulation. Child support is paid to a parent 
for the purpose of ensuring a child's needs are met. In this case, the Respondent contributed 
directly to the children's needs. The decree requires Respondent to assist in paying for clothing, 
food, school supplies and extracurricular activities. Those are the types of items that child 
support would normally cover. That the parties simply chose a more direct path for supplying 
these items to the children justified a deviation from the child support guidelines. The Appellant 
failed to make any showing at the hearing that the children's needs were no longer adequately 
met. Also, the stipulated agreement did not contain any language that in any way limited either 
party's support obligation. It fixed what the obligation was to be, in accordance with their 
agreement, and this agreement was approved by the court. 
In the case at bar, the trial court considered all relevant factors, including the fact that 
Respondent pays a flat monetary sum to the Appellant, in addition to contributing toward 
clothing, school supplies, food and extracurricular activities. The mere fact that the Appellant 
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now has decided she doesn't like the agreement made at the time of the original decree does not 
magically relieve her of the legal burden of proving a material and substantial change in 
circumstances. 
The guidelines are just that - guidelines. They may be modified or used differently 
depending upon circumstances. As the district court pointed out, "the guidelines were in place at 
the time of the original judgment. The parenting plan that was incorporated into the decree has a 
number of facets. Both sides were represented by competent counsel, and there is no argument or 
evidence that either side was misled or coerced into the agreements that were made. There is no 
suggested basis to set aside the trial comi's original approval of the child support levels for any 
reason. The mere fact that the dollar amount of child support deviated from the guidelines at the 
time of the original judgment is in-elevant at this juncture." 
Another factor to consider when determining whether deviation from the child 
support guidelines is a per se violation of public policy is the fact that both sides were 
represented by counsel. It should be noted that Appellant was not only represented by an 
attorney at all stages of the proceeding, but that her attorney was Stanley Welsh, who is a well-
known and highly respected family law attorney, lecturer and author. It should also be noted that 
the decree of divorce was prepared by Appellant's attorney, including the child support amount. 
Appellant argued vigorously that her agreement put her in an impossible position. 
However, when considering public policy, the court should also consider the options Appellant 
had from which to choose. First, she could have exercised her right to litigate the issue of child 
suppmi and custody in lieu of entering into a stipulation. Second, if she felt she had not chosen 
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wisely at the time of the original decree, she was given a second chance to litigate the issue when 
the Respondent brought forth a modification motion. Instead of allowing the Respondent the 
opportunity to argue the merits of his request to spend more time with his children, the Appellant 
fought the Motion and, eventually, won. Had she chosen to file a Counter Claim for increased 
child support, both parties would have had the opportunity to get what they desired - the 
Respondent more time with his children and the Appellant more money. 
c. Even if Magistrate Lee's decision was in error, the Appellant failed to argue it within the time 
prescribed by law or in the manner prescribed by law. 
The Appellant is requesting this court make a collateral attack of the original judgment, 
which is improper. In Levin v. Levin 122 Idaho 583 (Idaho 1992), the father was awarded 
primary custody and the mother was ordered, by stipulation, to pay $1000 per month in child 
support. However, the mother was quite wealthy, raking in about $13,000,000 from a trust. 
Eventually, the mother sought custody. The father opposed the change in custody and moved to 
increase child support. The court found no material change of circumstances and denied the 
mother's motion, but granted father's request for increased child support to $10,000 per month. 
The trial court held that the award of $1,000 per month was overly restrictive and did not take 
into account the factors required by 32-706. The Idaho Supreme Court overturned the trial 
court's decision stating: "The trial court's p01irayal of the prior magistrate's support award as 
being overly restrictive and not giving adequate weight to the 1980 amendments to LC. § 32-706, 
amounted to a collateral attack on the earlier court's judgment which had not been appealed." 
Respondent's Brief 11 
In this case, the Appellant should have brought a Motion pursuant to IRCP, Rule 60, 
which states 
" On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; ( 4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than six 
(6) months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. Such motion 
does not require leave from the Supreme Cami, or the district court, as the case may be, as 
though the judgment has been affirmed or settled upon appeal to that comi. This rule does not 
limit the power of a court to: (i) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding, or (ii) to set aside, as provided by law, within one (1) year after 
judgment was entered, a judgment obtained against a party who was not personally served with 
summons and complaint either in the state of Idaho or in any other jurisdiction, and who has 
failed to appear in said action, or (iii) to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." 
As the district court noted "A motion to modify child support should not be a substitute 
for a timely objection or challenge to the support issue in the trial court before the entry of 
judgment, or to a timely challenge to the judgment itself under I.R.C.P. 60 or its equivalents, or 
to a timely appeal from the judgment. See Waller v. State, 146 Idaho 234,239, 192 P.3d 1058, 
1063 (2008) ("The trial court found, and we agree, that I.R.C.P. 60(b) is the only identifiable 
legal basis for Waller's request to set aside or vacate the child support order ... by exercise of the 
court's equitable powers .... I.R.C.P. 60(b) also recognizes the district court's authority to entertain 
an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment on the basis of equity. 
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The Appellant could have also appealed the judgment. Idaho Appellate Rule 11 
grants "an appeal of the matter of right from certain judgments and court orders." Pursuant to 
IAR 14 appeals are made effective "only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of 
the District Court within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the 
court on any judgment order or decree of the District Court appealable as a matter of right in any 
civil or criminal action." The Appellant did not file an appeal and the time to file such an appeal 
has expired. 
2. The magistrate properly dismissed Appellant's petition for her failure to show a substantial and 
material change of circumstances. 
The well-established law in Idaho is that while the court does have continuing 
jurisdiction over the matter of child support, once support is fixed by final decree of a court it is 
subject to modification only upon a showing of a permanent and substantial change in 
circumstances. Kornfield v. Kornfield. 134 Idaho 383,385, 3 P.3d 61, 63 (Ct.App.2000). The 
decision of the trial court on a motion to modify child support is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion on appeal. The party seeking modification carries the burden of proof. Humberger v. 
Humberger, 134 Idaho 39,42-43,995 P.2d 809, 812-13 (2000). 
There does not appear to be any bright line rule as to how much of an increase in income 
constitutes a "substantial" change. However, the words used in the statute, "material" and 
"substantial", are easily defined. Substantial is defined as "ofreal worth or importance; of 
considerable value; valuable." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition. Material is defined as 
"imp01iant; more or less necessary; having influence or effect." Black Law Dictionary, 6th 
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edition. In the absence of a concrete rule, the legislature and the higher courts have clearly left a 
large amount of discretion with the trial judge. 
In this case, had the Respondent paid the suggested support as set forth by the guidelines, 
the increase would have been negligible. Appellant is trying to convince this court that the 
difference in child support is $711.50. If the Court agrees with this argument, litigants can make 
any deal about child support and then tum around the next day and file a motion to modify, not 
based on a substantial change of circumstances, but based upon the fact they simply changed 
their mind. This is ludicrous. If the parties had agreed to the amount recommended by the 
guidelines instead of the more direct agreement they did enter into, the Respondent's increase in 
child support would have nominal and not substantial in the least. 
As noted in the District Court's opinion, the evidence was not in dispute that the only 
change in circumstances since the entry of judgment that applied to child support was a change 
of approximately $3,000 per year in the difference between the parties' annual earnings - which 
amounted to an approximate 7% change overall. The District Court found that "If applied ... , 
this would have meant a change of less than $4 per month." 
The district court went on to explain that 
"Plaintiff relies upon Section 5 of the Idaho Child Support Guidelines, I.R.C.P. 6(c)(6), 
which provides that "the amount of child support provided for under these Guidelines may 
constitute a substantial and material change of circumstances for granting a motion for 
modification for child support obligations" (emphasis added). I think the only consistent way to 
read this provision is that the adoption of the rule could be a "change in circumstance" if the 
amount of support under the rule differed from an existing level of child support. Further if the 
guidelines as a whole are amended up or down, the event of such amendment might constitute a 
change supporting modification. 
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Here, it appears that the rule establishing the support guidelines was in existence when 
the original divorce degree was entered into, and there is no claim or evidence that the guidelines 
have been changed in any material fashion in the interim. To argue that a statute or rule that was 
in existence at the time of an event can be used to demonstrate a substantial change in 
circumstance after entry of a final judgment on that event would make no sense and flies in the 
face of the principle of finality of judgments and decrees 
In any event, because Section 5 uses the term "may," there is no basis for this court to 
conclude that the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion, erred finding that the plaintiff had 
not established a substantial and material change of circumstances. See Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 
841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995) ("When used in a statute, the word 'may' is permissive rather 
than the imperative or mandatory meaning of 'must' or' shall.')." 
3. The Magistrate did not abuse his discretion when he awarded Appellant Attorney's Fees 
in the amount of $2500 and Respondent fees in the amount of $1012.50. 
In Woods v. Sanders, 244 P.3d 197, 150 Idaho 53 (Idaho 2010), the magistrate found that 
the "factors have been met as set forth in Idaho Code § 12-121 for an award to Plaintiff of his 
reasonable attorney's fees in this matter." At trial, the magistrate stated: "Based on the answer 
provided by Ms. Sanders and the documents she has filed, I am going to grant your motion based 
on 12-121. Because Sanders did not provide any admissible evidence to support her defense 
against the modification for child custody other than the unsupported allegations presented in her 
affidavit, and because she failed to attend the trial or any other hearing, the magistrate had 
sufficient evidence to conclude that Sanders acted unreasonably in defending the modification 
motion. Therefore, the magistrate did not abuse its discretion and this Court affirms the award of 
attorney fees." 
A magistrate may also reduce the amount of attorney's fees requested. Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 54( e )(1) states in pertinent part that "In any civil action the court may 
award reasonable attorney fees ... " (emphasis added). The Court is to consider the factors set 
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forth in Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54( e )(3 ), but is not required to address each one or 
make written findings. See US Bank v. Kuenzli 134 Idaho 222 (2000); Perkins v. US 
Transformer 132 Idaho 427 (1999). 
In this case, the court reasonably found that at the trial level, Appellant's Motion to 
Modify was unsupported and frivolous. The Appellant failed to prove there was a permanent 
and material change in circumstances which would justify a change is support. In this instant 
case, the Respondent was the prevailing party as defined by Idaho Civil Rule 54( d)(l )(B.) When 
requesting attorney's fees, the Respondent submitted a reasonable amount of fees and addressed 
all relevant factors as follows: 
"(A) The time and labor required: The approximate amount of time spent in the defense of 
this matter was seven (7) hours. The hours are itemized in the memorandum of costs filed 
concurrently herewith. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions: There was no novel or particularly difficult 
issues raised. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, the experience and ability of the 
attorney in the particular field of law: This is a case easily handled by an attorney versed in 
matters of family law. Attorney Kelso was licensed in 1996 and has worked in the general 
practice of law for approximately seventeen (17) years. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work: The amount billed was $150 per hour. It is believed 
this amount is equal to the fees charged by local counsel. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent: The fee was hourly. 
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(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case: There were no 
unusual time limitations or unusual circumstances of this case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained: The total time put into this case by counsel 
was approximately seven (7) hours, not including the preparation of the Motion for Fees and 
attendant documents. The Defendant was the prevailing party and the court ruled the plaintiff 
has no basis in law for filing the modification. 
(H) The undesirability of the case: This case was no more undesirable than any other case. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client: This was counsel's 
first representation of this particular client (concurrent with the objection to attorney's fees filed 
after the Defendant's Petition for Modification was dismissed.) 
(J) Awards in similar cases: Unknown. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research), if 
the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case: One (1) hour ofresearch 
was performed for the purpose of providing case law to the Court regarding the need for a party 
to show a substantial change in circumstances and to determine if an Idaho Court had ruled on 
what constitutes a material change with regard to increased salaries for purposes of calculating 
child support." 
In Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 196 P.3d 341, 146 Idaho 423 (Idaho 2008), the court awarded 
a reduced amount of attorney's fees. The higher court found that the District Court did not 
reduce it in the proper manner. The court held that "The amount of attorney's fees to be 
awarded under LC.§ 12-120(3) is committed to the district court's discretion. (Citations 
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omitted). The burden is on the party opposing the award to demonstrate that the district court 
abused its discretion. Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass' v. Neibaur 133 Idaho 402,412, 987 
P .2d 314, 324 (Idaho 1999) .. a trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the 
issue as one of discretion, (2) acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the 
applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason. ( citation 
omitted). When awarding attomey1s fees, a district court must consider the applicable factors set 
forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and may consider any other factor that the court deems appropriate." 
(citations omitted). Though it is not necessary for the court to address all of the I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3) factors in writing, the record must clearly indicate the court considered all of the factors. 
Id. However, the bottom line in an award of attorney's fees is reasonableness." 
In this case, the magistrate propetiy reduced Appellant's attorney's fees. When 
reducing the Appellant's award of fees from over $18,000 to $2500, Magistrate Frates wrote a 
detailed opinion found in the record at pages 158 through 163. It properly considered all the 
criteria set forth in rule 54. When ordering the Respondent attorney's fees of a approximately 
$1000, Judge Frates did not write a detailed order but clearly stated the justification on the record 
and noted the oral statements in the judgment. 
The Appellant, in her request for attorney's fees, asked the court for an award 
totaling approximately $18,000. The Court properly considered several factors, including the 
short lifespan of the case, the ease of trial, and the fact the defendant was prose. In addition, it 
was clear at the pretrial held September 17, 2012. the Court did not believe a material change in 
circumstances had occmTed. (See Pre-Trial Transcript, p. 7, lines 18-21; and p. 8, 1. 17-20). At 
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that point ( or even at some earlier point), it would have been prudent and efficient for the 
Appellant to file a Motion to Dismiss. In fact, as stated in the Respondent's Objection to 
Attorney's Fees, Appellant actually prepared a Motion to Dismiss but never filed it. Had 
Appellant done so, the case would have been summarily dismissed without need for further 
expenditures. 
In addition, the attorney's fees sought by Appellant were excessive and umeasonable. 
Both Appellant and Respondent sought a modification. Both parties lost due to their failures to 
show a material and substantial change of circumstances. Ironically, the parties virtually identical 
issues had identical outcomes. However, the difference in cost to get there was over $17,000. 
The magistrate did not abuse his discretion in awarding fees to the Respondent, nor did 
he abuse his discretion in reducing the award to Appellant. 
With regard to the award of fees as the district com1 level, that too is reasonable. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL - ATTORNEY FEES 
Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, Respondent is asserting his claim for 
attorney's fees for the defense of this appeal. This appeal was brought furiously and without 
merit. It was not based upon legal justification and the facts failed to support any of the 
Appellant's arguments. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellant's arguments for overturning the magistrate and district court are without 
a legal basis or justification. The trial court and district court provided sound legal justification 
for the entry of two awards of attorney's fees to the Respondent and a reduced amount of 
attorney's fees for the Appellate. In addition, the courts correctly held that the Appellant had 
failed to show a material and substantial change of circumstances and correctly dismissed her 
petition. Furthermore, this appeal is frivolous and without merit, justifying an award of 
attorney's fees and costs to the Respondent. Therefore, Respondent respectfully requests this 
court deny Appellant's appeal, uphold the lower courts and award Respondent Attorney Fees and 
Costs for defense of this appeal. 
Sn,~~ l ~ l d CJL Y 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CER\T{Y that a true, full, complete and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument was on the . ( day of September 2014, was mailed via federal express, postage 
prepaid, to Richard Eisma!nn, 3016 Caldwell Bou va d, Nampa, ID 83651. 
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in compliance with all 
of the requirements set out in I.AR. 34.1, and that an electronic copy was served on each party at 
the following email address(t?S): counsel@eismannlaw.com 
:r,/ 
Dated and certified this lliay of September, 20 
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